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Abstract
Unbalanced bidding is a common practice used in both unit price and lump sum contracts. Contractors may unbalance their bids 
in  different forms for various reasons. The studies in the literature either focus on developing optimization models that assist 
contractors in winning contracts and maximizing profits of their bids through unbalancing or developing models that assist owners 
in detecting and/or preventing unbalanced bids during the bid evaluation stage. Unbalanced bidding is one of the most controversial 
subjects in the construction management literature and practice. Although there is no consensus on whether it is unethical or not, 
this practice is not usually for the benefit of owners. Therefore, owners have the right to reject the unbalanced bids and create a fair 
competition environment if they have a mechanism to detect it during the bid evaluation process. The main objective of this study 
is to propose a model, which consists of five different grading systems and helps owners in detecting unbalanced bids during the 
tendering process. In the proposed model, owners may either calculate the individual grades of each bidder or calculate the final score 
of each bidder by assigning different weights to these grading systems according to the project characteristics or their own needs. 
The final scores and bid prices of the contractors can be simultaneously evaluated. In order to demonstrate the applicability of the 
proposed model, an illustrative example is presented. It can be concluded that the proposed model can be effectively and easily used 
by owners for detecting unbalanced bids. This paper is the revised version of the paper that has been published in the proceedings of 
the Creative Construction Conference 2018 (Polat et al., 2018).
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1 Introduction
Design-Bid-Build is the oldest, most familiar and tradi-
tional project delivery system in the construction indus-
try. Although various alternatives (e.g. Design-Build, 
Professional Construction Management, etc.) to this proj-
ect delivery system have been developed, it is still most 
commonly preferred by a great number of owners, par-
ticularly in the public sector. Construction projects built 
according to this project delivery system mainly under-
goes five sequential phases:
1. pre-design phase, 
2. design phase, 
3. bid and award phase, 
4. construction phase, and 
5. post construction phase. 
In the bid and award phase, the owners aim to select 
the most appropriate contractors, who are capable of com-
pleting the project in budget, on time and at desired qual-
ity (Mehta et al., 2009). Therefore, this phase plays a key 
role in the overall project success.
Unbalanced bidding can be defined as a process of manip-
ulating the prices of various bid items by increasing the prices 
of some items and simultaneously decreasing the prices of 
other items without changing the total bid price (Cattell et 
al., 2007). Construction bidders may tend to submit unbal-
anced bids for various reasons such as achieving competitive 
advantage over other bidders, who submit balanced bids, and 
thereby winning the contract, minimizing the financing cost 
of the project, improving cash flow, increasing the profit, etc. 
(Hyari, 2016; Hyari et al., 2016; Nikpour et al., 2017).
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There are several types of unbalancing, depending 
on the contractor's motivation for employing this practice. 
The most common types are front-end loading, back-end 
loading, and quantity error exploitation (Cattell et al., 2007).
In the first practice, i.e. front-end loading, construc-
tion bidders tend to change the unit prices of some items 
by offering higher, than average prices for items that will 
be carried out at the beginning of the project, whereas 
offering lower prices for items that will be carried out 
at the end of the project (Su and Lucko, 2015). This prac-
tice may improve the contractor's cash flow. That is why 
this practice is also named as cash-flow unbalancing 
(Hyari et al., 2016). On the other hand, it may bring about 
higher owner payments when the value of time is taken 
into account (Nikpour et al., 2017).
Contrary to front-end loading, back-end loading is 
the process of overpricing items that will be carried out 
at the end of the project or are expected to have a higher 
rate of escalation (Cattell et al., 2007). Back-end loading 
may lead to larger amounts in escalation in compensation 
for inflation (Cattell et al., 2008). This type of practice is 
common in long duration construction projects carried out 
in high inflation rate countries (Nikpour et al., 2017).
Quantity error exploitation, a.k.a. individual rate load-
ing, usually occurs when a contractor predicts variations 
in the design documents or identifies overestimation and/
or underestimation in the measured quantities. In this case, 
contractors tend to increase the prices of items whose quan-
tities are underestimated and to lower the prices of items 
whose quantities are underestimated (Cattell et al., 2008; 
Prajapati and Bhavsar, 2017; Su and Lucko, 2015). In this 
type of pricing strategy, the contractor may considerably 
increase his profit by taking advantage of the error in the 
quantities measured by the owner (Hyari, 2016).
Unbalanced bidding can be employed by contractors when 
they are bidding unit price or lump sum contracts (Su and 
Lucko, 2014). In unit price contracts, bids can be unbalanced 
by manipulating unit prices of items without affecting the 
total bid price. In general, owners make the award decision 
based on the total bid price and do not pay much attention to 
variations in unit prices of items offered by different bidders. 
For this reason, it is more difficult to detect unbalanced bids 
created by quantity error exploitation for owners, especially 
in unit price contracts (Nikpour et al., 2017). Therefore, this 
study focused on unbalanced bids created using quantity 
error exploitation in unit price contracts.
The main objective of this study to provide own-
ers with a model, which may assist them in detecting 
unbalanced bids. The proposed model uses five different 
grading systems. Owners may assign different weights 
to these grading systems and thereby the final score of 
each bidder can be calculated. All bidders can be eval-
uated based on the calculated final scores as well as the 
offered bid prices. In order to demonstrate how the pro-
posed model can be performed in construction projects, 
an illustrative example is presented. The findings of this 
study revealed that the proposed model can help owners in 
detecting and preventing unbalanced bids during the bid 
evaluation stage.
The abstract, introduction, unbalanced bidding in the 
construction industry, detection and prevention of unbal-
anced bids: the developed models, and conclusions sections 
have been revised in this version of the paper. The abstract 
section has been changed for enabling better understand-
ing of the objective and findings of the research. The lit-
erature review presented in the introduction, unbalanced 
bidding in the construction industry, and detection and pre-
vention of unbalanced bids: the developed models sections 
has been considerably improved by adding new references 
so that the importance and contribution of this paper to 
the existing body of knowledge can be better understood. 
In the conclusions section, limitations of this study and the 
future direction of this research have been clearly stated.
2 Unbalanced Bidding in the Construction Industry
The idea of unbalanced bidding is not a new concept in the 
construction industry. It is commonly acknowledged that 
unbalanced bidding was first introduced by Gates (1967) 
as a bidding strategy. Later, Stark (1968) proposed a lin-
ear programming model for optimizing unbalanced bids. 
Following these studies, numerous researches have been 
conducted to address unbalanced bids.
Unbalanced bidding is one of the most contentious top-
ics in the construction management domain. While some 
researchers encourage unbalanced bidding and consider it 
as a bidding strategy, others discourage this practice and 
consider it as an unethical and illegal (Hyari, 2017).
In the literature, there are numerous studies focusing on 
unbalanced bidding. These studies can be categorized into 
two main categories:
1. the studies that aim to develop optimization mod-
els that assist contractors in winning contracts and 
maximizing profits of their bids through unbalanc-
ing (e.g. Afshar and Amiri, 2010a; 2010b; Cattell 
et al., 2008; Christodoulou, 2008; Liu et al., 2009; 
Nassar, 2004; Su and Lucko, 2014; 2015), and 
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2. the studies that aim to develop models that assist 
owners in detecting and/or preventing unbalanced 
bids during the bid evaluation stage (e.g. Arditi and 
Chotibhongs, 2009; Bell, 1989; Hyari, 2016; Hyari et 
al., 2016; Nikpour et al., 2017; Renes, 2012; Shrestha et 
al., 2012; Skitmore and Cattell, 2013; Venkatesh and 
Rao, 2017; Wang, 2004; Yin et al., 2010).
Although there is no consensus on whether unbalanced 
bidding is ethical or not, there are various disadvantages of 
unbalanced bids for owners, such as; prevention of real com-
petition environment, risk of unbalanced bid being excluded 
in the bid evaluation stage, if it is detected by owner, obli-
gation of owner to pay in advance in unbalanced bid cre-
ated by front-loading, obligation of owner to pay more due to 
inflation in unbalanced bid created by end-loading, failure of 
the lowest bidder at the end of project, ease of entry into the 
construction industry, etc. (Gransberg and Riemer, 2009; 
Loulakis and McLaughlin, 2011).
3 Detection and Prevention of Unbalanced Bids: 
The Developed Models
Owners intend to detect unbalanced bids in advance as a 
preventive action because of its negative effects on the 
overall project performance. In the literature, there are few 
studies that aim to assist owners in detecting and/or pre-
venting unbalanced bids during the bid evaluation process. 
Unbalanced bidding is not forbidden in the construction 
industry, but some researchers consider it as an unethical 
and risky strategy. If an owner has a simple and system-
atic mechanism to detect unbalanced bids, a fair competi-
tion environment can be created. Therefore, detection of 
unbalanced bids, especially quantity error exploitation, 
is a critical issue for owners. This type of unbalancing is 
much more difficult to detect than front-end loaded bids.
Bell (1989) proposed a single percentage factor method, 
which prevents unbalanced bidding in unit price contract. 
This method aims to preclude quantity error exploita-
tion bids and also prevent front-loading and end-load-
ing of bid. Wang (2004) developed an electronic based 
procedure to manage bid unbalancing in lump sum con-
tracts. This method mainly focuses on the adjustment of 
rates submitted by the lowest bidder in estimated quan-
tities and the rates submitted by all qualified bidders 
without affecting the total bid price of bidder. Arditi and 
Chotibhongs (2009) developed two separate process-
ing models to detect unbalanced bids created by front-
end loaded and quantity error exploitation. These models 
are based on comparing prices of each bid item with the 
engineer’s (i.e. owner's) estimates and the average prices 
offered by bidders. Yin et al. (2010) stated that unbalanced 
bidding is a tool to win the contract with the lowest price 
for contractors. On the other hand, unbalanced bids may 
cause lower contract price but higher project completion 
price. Their study provides a reference for owner's proj-
ect investment control. Renes (2012) suggested that unbal-
ance bidding can be eliminated or mitigated by hiding 
quantities of activity estimated by owner, and also pro-
posed that estimated quantities for each bid item may 
be presented to bidders as a range of values rather than 
as a single value. Shrestha et al. (2012) conducted a linear 
correlation analysis to investigate whether bidders were 
applying front-end loading method or not. Skitmore and 
Cattell (2013) presented a simulation study, which illus-
trates the likely impacts of using typical unbalanced bid 
detection methods under some assumptions. Hyari (2016) 
proposed a model for prevention of unbalanced bids rather 
than detection. The model provides a systematic proce-
dure, which uses the average unit price of all bidders to 
adjust unit price of every bid item submitted by each bid-
der without affecting the total bid amount of the bidder. 
Hyari et al. (2016) presented a detection model to help 
owners in detecting unbalanced bids. The proposed model 
is based on considering uncertainty in estimated quanti-
ties of activity in order to detect unbalanced bids in the 
bid evaluation stage. The model uses Monte Carlo simu-
lation to measure the risk impacts of differences between 
actual quantities of activity and estimated quantities to 
evaluate submitted bids. Venkatesh and Rao (2017) pro-
posed an approach, which aims to help owners in selecting 
optimum bidder through neutralizing the impact of largely 
varied bid prices. Nikpour et al. (2017) proposed a detec-
tion tool, which develops Bid Markup Distribution Index 
Graph (BMDI), to identify unbalanced bids in unit price 
contracts during the bid evaluation process. The devel-
oped tool also uses Monte Carlo simulation to consider 
the impacts of cost uncertainties and risks.
4 The Proposed Unbalanced Bid Detection Model
This study aims to provide owners with a model, 
which may assist them in detecting unbalanced bids. 
For this purpose, the existing models were reviewed. 
The proposed detection model uses five different grading 
systems. Owners may assign different weights to these 
grading systems and thereby the final score of each bidder 
can be calculated. All bidders can be evaluated based on 
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the calculated final scores as well as the offered bid prices. 
The five different grading systems in the proposed model 
are explained briefly in the Sections 4.1-4.5.
4.1 First Grading System
The main idea behind this grading system is to compare 
the ratio of each activity's total price in the bid price offered 
by each bidder with the one estimated by the owner. From the 
bidder's viewpoint, the price of each activity i (i = 1, 2, …, n) 
is calculated multiplying its quantity (qi) by its unit price 
estimated by the bidder (bupi). From the owner's view-
point, the price of each activity i (i = 1, 2, …, n) is calcu-
lated multiplying its quantity (qi) by its unit price estimated 
by the owner (oupi). The bid price (BP) is the sum of prices 
of every activity estimated by bidders (Eq. (1)), whereas the 
estimated construction cost (ECC) is the sum of prices of 
every activity estimated by owner (Eq. (2)). The ratio of 
each activity's total price estimated by each bidder in the 
bid price (bri) and the ratio of each activity's total price esti-
mated by the owner in the estimated construction cost (ori) 
are calculated using Eqs. (3) and (4). Then the comparison 
ratio for the first grading system (r1) is calculated by dividing 
bri by ori (see Eq. (5)). Having calculated this comparison 
ratio, a grade is given to each activity (g1i) based on the inter-
vals given in Table 1. The total score obtained from the first 
grading system (BTS1) is calculated using Eq. (6), where gmax 
is the maximum value of the grading system 1 (g
max
 = 42).
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4.2 Second Grading System
The main idea behind this grading system is to compare 
the unit price of each activity i (bupi) offered by each bid-
der with the ones estimated by the owner (oupi). In this 
grading system, the comparison ratio (r2) is calculated 
using Eq. (7). Bidders obtain a grade for each activity (g2i) 
based on the intervals given in Table 1. The total score 
received from the second grading system (BTS2) is found 
using Eq. (8), where g
max is the maximum value of the 
grading system 2 (g
max
 = 42).
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4.3 Third Grading System
The main idea behind this grading system is to compare 
the unit price of each activity (bupi) offered by each bidder 
Table 1 Grade values for grading system 1, 2, 3 and 5
Comparison Ratio Grade Comparison Ratio Grade Comparison Ratio Grade
r ≤ 0.9 42 0.965 < r ≤  0.970 28 1.035 < r ≤ 1.040 14
0.900 < r ≤ 0.905 41 0.970 < r ≤  0.975 27 1.040 < r ≤ 1.045 13
0.905 < r ≤ 0.910 40 0.975 < r ≤ 0.980 26 1.045 < r ≤ 1.050 12
0.910 < r ≤ 0.915 39 0.980 < r ≤ 0.985 25 1.050 < r ≤ 1.055 11
0.915 < r ≤ 0.920 38 0.985 < r ≤ 0.990 24 1.055 < r ≤ 1.060 10
0.920 < r ≤ 0.925 37 0.990 < r ≤ 0.995 23 1.060 < r ≤ 1.065 9
0.925 < r ≤ 0.930 36 0.995 < r ≤ 1.000 22 1.065 < r ≤ 1.070 8
0.930 < r ≤ 0.935 35 1.000 < r ≤ 1.005 21 1.070 < r ≤ 1.075 7
0.935 < r ≤ 0.940 34 1.005 < r ≤ 1.010 20 1.075 < r ≤ 1.080 6
0.940 < r ≤ 0.945 33 1.010 < r ≤ 1.015 19 1.080 < r ≤ 1.085 5
0.945 < r ≤ 0.950 32 1.015 < r ≤ 1.020 18 1.085 < r ≤ 1.090 4
0.950 < r ≤ 0.955 31 1.020 < r ≤ 1.025 17 1.090 < r ≤ 1.095 3
0.955 < r ≤ 0.960 30 1.025 < r ≤ 1.030 16 1.095 < r ≤ 1.100 2
0.960 < r ≤ 0.965 29 1.030 < r ≤ 1.035 15 1.100 < r 1
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with the average of unit prices (aupi) offered by n number 
of bidders. The average unit price of each activity is calcu-
lated using Eq. (9) and the comparison ratio (r3) is calculated 
using Eq. (10). Bidders obtain the grade (g3i) according to 
the comparison ratio obtained for each activity (see Table 1). 
Then, the total score received from the second grading sys-
tem (BTS3) is found using Eq. (11), where gmax is the maxi-
mum value of the grading system 3 (g
max
 = 42).
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4.4 Fourth Grading System
The main idea behind this grading system is to compare 
the bid price offered by the bidder (BP) with the estimated 
construction cost (ECC). The comparison ratio (r4) is cal-
culated by Eq. (12). Bidders obtain the grade (g4) accord-
ing to this ratio based on the intervals presented in Table 2. 
The total score for grading system 4 (BTS4) is calculated 
using Eq. (13), where g
max
 = 21.
r BP
ECC4
=  (12)
BTS g
g4
4
100= ×
max
 (13)
4.5 Fifth Grading System
The main idea behind this grading system is to compare 
to the sum of total prices of activities whose quantities 
may likely increase during the construction phase offered 
by bidders (bris) with the ones estimated by the owner (oris) 
(see Eqs. (14), (15)). The comparison ratio (r5) is calcu-
lated by Eq. (16). Bidders obtain the grade (g5) accord-
ing to the comparison ratio presented in Table 1. The total 
score for the grading system 5 (BTS5) is calculated using 
Eq. (17), where g
max
 = 42.
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A comparison rate is calculated for all grading systems. 
Bidders obtain grades according to these ratios. Grading 
tables (Tables 1 and 2) have been prepared so that bidders 
can be evaluated fairly.
Two different grading tables were prepared within 
scope of the proposed model. Grading system 1, 2, 3, 
and 5 have a wide range, while grading system 4 has a nar-
row range. This indicates that grading system 4 is more 
sensitive than the others. In grading system 4, if the com-
parison rate is higher than 1.050, it gets the lowest grade 
(gmin = 1), while if it is lower than 0.950, it gives the highest 
grade (g
max
 = 21). This function also applies to the others, 
only the limit values are different.
Finally, different weights to these grading systems can 
be assigned to calculate the final score of each bidder. 
The final scores of bidders are calculated using Eq. (18) 
and they are evaluated based on their final scores as well 
as the total bid price.
FS w BTS w BTS
w BTS w BTS w BTS
= × + ×
+ × + × + ×
1 1 2 2
3 3 4 4 5 5
 (18)
where w1 is the weight for the first grading system, w2 is 
for the second one, w3 is for the third one, w4 is for the 
fourth one, w5 is for the fifth one.
Table 2 Grade values for grading system 4
Comparison Ratio Grade Comparison Ratio Grade
r  ≤ 0.950 21 1.005 < r ≤ 1.010 10
0.950 < r ≤ 0.955 20 1.010 < r ≤ 1.015 9
0.955 < r ≤ 0.960 19 1.015 < r ≤ 1.020 8
0.960 < r ≤ 0.965 18 1.020 < r ≤ 1.025 7
0.965 < r ≤ 0.970 17 1.025 < r ≤ 1.030 6
0.970 < r ≤ 0.975 16 1.030 < r ≤ 1.035 5
0.975 < r ≤ 0.980 15 1.035 < r ≤ 1.040 4
0.980 < r ≤ 0.985 14 1.040 < r ≤ 1.045 3
0.985 < r ≤ 0.990 13 1.045 < r ≤ 1.050 2
0.990 < r ≤ 0.995 12 1.050 < r 1
0.995 < r ≤ 1.000 11
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5 Illustrative Example
In order to illustrate how the proposed model can be applied 
in construction projects, an example is presented. The pre-
sented example consists of 72 activities, 10 of which are 
related to groundwork, in other words, quantities of these 
activities may increase during the construction phase. 
The unit price of each activity estimated by the owner 
are taken from "The Construction and Installation Unit 
Prices and Market Values Book" published by Ministry 
of Environment and Urban Planning in 2017 in Turkey. 
8 different bidders have been asked to propose unit prices 
for these activities. The units, quantities, unit prices of 
these 72 activities estimated by the owner (O) and pro-
posed by 8 bidders (B) are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 Input data for illustrative example
Act.
ID Unit Quantity
Unit Prices (TL)
O B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
A1 m3 700 14.38 14.75 13.07 15.50 15.56 14.92 13.64 14.88 14.66
A2 m3 365 38.83 41.91 41.25 42.38 35.58 41.11 38.14 40.41 36.32
A3 m3 850 2.84 3.08 2.59 2.96 2.63 2.98 2.84 2.86 2.68
A4 m3 736 4.83 5.29 4.57 5.27 5.15 4.36 4.46 4.62 4.72
A5 m 198 67.70 65.94 63.94 74.14 65.43 69.76 68.75 69.39 62.33
A6 m3 59 31.88 29.82 28.96 29.66 29.41 33.12 29.21 28.89 29.34
A7 m3 150 14.19 13.60 13.21 14.34 13.67 13.78 15.17 13.64 15.11
A
8
m3 90 29.19 26.97 28.68 29.95 31.42 30.40 31.12 29.52 30.38
A9 m3 2000 178.63 170.44 183.53 173.77 166.04 189.94 187.99 175.84 169.66
A10 m 1200 335.43 330.84 362.48 336.29 333.25 322.75 318.94 329.43 353.08
A11 m 650 68.40 65.53 74.79 69.38 63.26 64.79 69.13 72.10 73.25
A12 m3 350 52.20 51.26 47.00 54.89 56.72 47.53 54.14 52.51 56.04
A13 m3 100 86.29 84.53 92.11 85.72 91.16 88.14 85.52 88.90 82.79
A14 m3 360 121.63 112.82 133.19 131.99 130.73 122.52 128.27 111.87 124.88
A15 m 36 29.19 29.64 28.97 30.16 27.98 28.77 31.89 29.44 27.92
A16 m 40 33.40 35.59 34.05 32.36 36.04 35.12 36.57 32.56 36.23
A17 m2 1000 22.18 20.98 23.41 20.95 23.78 22.35 23.19 23.00 20.95
A
18
m2 750 23.24 23.34 21.41 23.86 21.85 21.32 24.63 21.88 22.87
A19 m2 635 31.39 32.96 31.66 29.76 30.56 32.36 28.90 29.47 33.33
A20 m2 400 35.64 36.75 37.55 36.58 39.03 35.38 37.56 35.40 36.21
A21 m2 348 38.05 39.78 38.77 39.28 35.44 35.79 39.19 39.63 35.08
A22 m2 250 50.16 50.34 49.73 52.14 45.85 52.27 49.12 50.30 49.46
A23 m2 100 26.56 26.26 27.36 26.88 25.07 24.98 27.50 24.59 27.82
A24 m2 150 35.63 36.26 34.12 37.72 34.84 35.66 35.98 32.82 35.03
A25 m2 75 23.61 24.87 21.25 21.81 24.29 23.15 23.41 24.72 24.89
A26 m2 98 28.59 25.89 26.65 28.53 28.52 31.41 28.69 28.21 30.46
A27 m2 50 27.29 27.41 25.95 29.84 26.82 28.77 25.32 25.65 24.73
A
28
m2 43 29.98 30.20 29.84 27.50 30.75 28.48 32.57 28.26 30.09
A29 m2 66 44.61 45.92 47.46 44.67 40.65 48.92 42.76 43.53 41.53
A30 m2 40 58.94 54.01 56.03 53.11 59.19 59.65 54.99 59.98 60.40
A31 m2 40 39.54 43.20 42.80 39.07 37.86 38.69 42.66 41.16 39.66
A32 m2 100 40.24 42.55 39.59 41.02 42.52 43.04 41.36 41.56 36.69
A33 m2 450 1.94 1.75 2.08 2.01 1.94 2.00 1.99 2.01 1.75
A34 m2 350 2.35 2.17 2.48 2.39 2.27 2.55 2.20 2.58 2.19
A35 m2 40 16.91 15.70 15.29 15.72 16.19 15.85 15.66 16.05 17.10
A36 m2 60 20.71 18.91 20.89 20.97 20.51 21.01 22.31 20.95 20.96
A37 m2 50 14.68 15.50 14.91 13.82 13.55 13.29 14.37 14.57 13.84
A
38
m2 1000 27.71 26.86 27.56 26.32 29.55 26.55 26.78 27.64 28.43
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The estimated construction cost (ECC) estimated by the 
owner is 13,766,619.41 TL, and the bid prices offered 
by 8 bidders are 14,043,276.86 (BP1), 13,826,569.14 (BP2), 
13,389,997.59 (BP3), 13,624,850.19 (BP4), 13,947,114.50 (BP5), 
13,622,893.85 (BP6), 13,641,083.17 (BP7), and 
13,538,572.61 (BP
8
), respectively. In this study, the weights 
are 20 % for first grading system, 15 % for the second one, 
10 % for the third one, 15 % for the fourth one, and 40 % 
for the fifth one. It should be kept in mind that these weights 
can differ depending on the needs of the owner. The final 
scores calculated for 8 bidders are presented in Table 4.
Based on the final scores presented in Table 4, 
Bidder 8 (B
8
) achieved the highest final score and 
Bidder 3 (B3) achieved the lowest final score. Although B3 
offered the lowest bid price and received the highest 
grades from the second, third and fourth grading systems, 
it received the lowest final score because it received the 
lowest grade from the fifth grading system whose weight 
is the highest one. Consequently, B3 achieved a very low 
score in the fifth grading system and this negatively 
affected the final score. On the other hand, B
8
 is above 
average grade in all grading systems, although it does 
not offer the lowest bid price and has got the highest final 
score. Therefore, B
8
 is the most appropriate bidder for the 
owner. It can be concluded that B3 offers the most unbal-
anced bid, whereas B
8
 offers the most balanced bid.
Act.
ID Unit Quantity
Unit Prices (TL)
O B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8
A39 m2 450 43.24 39.04 46.78 45.19 46.00 43.59 45.01 45.12 47.13
A40 m2 900 32.39 34.31 29.90 34.25 33.58 32.77 29.28 31.71 29.34
A41 m2 650 33.90 33.90 30.71 36.87 36.48 30.83 35.46 31.94 31.03
A42 m2 100 6.29 6.84 5.71 6.33 5.92 5.68 5.97 6.86 6.02
A43 m2 1000 1.29 1.29 1.31 1.23 1.40 1.36 1.22 1.19 1.18
A44 m2 150 7.33 7.01 6.67 6.64 7.45 7.91 7.12 7.29 7.64
A45 m2 2000 11.78 11.58 12.45 11.39 11.86 12.38 11.66 12.90 12.94
A46 m2 1600 30.04 29.74 30.87 31.84 27.61 30.66 31.46 29.77 30.38
A47 m2 2000 29.56 30.55 30.33 30.01 32.43 28.17 30.23 29.49 27.07
A
48
m3 600 4.59 4.65 4.72 4.72 4.68 4.50 4.27 4.87 4.15
A49 m3 450 5.84 5.36 6.42 5.29 5.88 6.11 5.41 6.06 5.64
A50 m2 750 4.83 5.29 4.61 4.97 5.18 4.77 4.79 4.86 5.21
A51 m2 1600 115.81 107.85 117.90 125.97 116.49 107.78 122.21 120.78 120.28
A52 m2 650 136.51 142.73 139.82 133.89 126.59 128.11 149.12 141.47 126.39
A53 m2 650 88.36 89.02 81.44 91.52 92.22 93.89 89.25 79.90 81.71
A54 m2 250 123.24 133.28 134.02 112.88 133.04 134.99 119.83 131.82 114.27
A55 m2 690 50.34 48.72 47.31 53.42 49.00 46.54 53.07 51.53 45.89
A56 m2 600 170.88 157.50 161.31 160.47 179.91 166.13 182.67 164.95 182.67
A57 m2 350 319.38 338.86 338.76 344.12 339.48 325.54 350.95 306.97 302.08
A
58
m2 400 250.09 261.30 253.70 264.69 249.89 244.55 265.10 264.46 226.00
A59 ton 1300 2096.56 2127.33 2152.31 1941.54 2089.57 2077.30 2026.49 1988.62 2045.57
A60 ton 1650 2017.94 2140.37 2143.31 1877.71 1975.24 1998.95 1887.98 2160.53 1974.92
A61 ton 350 1972.66 1871.37 1796.76 2120.92 2169.36 1789.12 2155.85 1837.37 1987.05
A62 ton 1000 1939.23 1985.11 1832.36 1762.37 1999.50 2115.62 2044.00 1860.08 1918.36
A63 ton 1150 1914.79 1914.13 1780.31 2038.14 1781.33 1987.31 1875.30 1810.11 1885.75
A64 ton 200 3386.01 3642.50 3635.81 3425.98 3236.22 3658.23 3346.48 3591.23 3238.26
A6 kg 4000 8.64 9.39 8.07 8.58 7.87 8.65 9.13 8.38 7.97
A66 m2 2000 9.59 9.16 10.29 10.06 9.74 10.16 9.55 8.82 10.51
A67 m2 600 13.00 12.96 13.32 14.30 14.00 13.68 11.84 12.36 14.07
A
68
m2 150 5.23 5.62 5.34 5.53 5.32 5.06 4.91 5.17 5.45
A69 m2 2000 15.65 14.26 16.26 14.72 16.25 15.96 14.87 15.75 16.47
A70 m2 2000 18.56 19.20 16.81 18.13 19.78 18.95 17.37 17.73 18.78
A71 m2 700 28.60 27.78 27.36 26.28 31.23 30.24 27.97 27.13 28.49
A72 m2 2000 20.88 21.98 22.75 22.95 19.38 19.91 21.36 19.67 22.51
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6 Conclusions
Unbalanced bidding is a major issue and an important 
unethical problem for owner in the construction indus-
try. Owner has right to reject unbalanced bids, but it is 
hard to detect unbalancing because award decision mostly 
depends on the total bid price and changes in unit price of 
bid items are usually not taken into consideration. For these 
reasons, it is more difficult for owner to detect quantity 
error exploitation bids, especially in unit price contracts. 
If an owner can detect an unbalanced bid, a fair competi-
tion environment can be created in the bidding process.
This study focuses on quantity error exploitation in unit 
price contracts and aims to provide owners with a model, 
which assists them in detecting the potential unbalanced 
bids. In order to achieve this objective, the relevant lit-
erature was reviewed and then a model was proposed. 
The proposed model is designed to detect unbalanced bids 
by using five different grading systems. The final scores 
of bidders are calculated by assigning different weights to 
these grading systems. Bidders are evaluated according to 
their final scores as well as the total bid price. In order to 
demonstrate how the proposed model can be performed 
in construction projects, an illustrative example was pre-
sented. The outcomes of proposed model have shown that 
it is a useful tool for detecting unbalanced bids created 
by quantity error exploitation method in unit price con-
tracts. This study also showed that when selecting the 
most appropriate contractor for project, owner should take 
into consideration not only bid price offered by bidders but 
also unit prices offered for each item.
This study is limited as it only focuses on unbalanced 
bids created by using quantity error exploitation method 
in unit price contracts. In future studies, the models 
addressing unbalanced bids in different types of contracts 
and created by using front-end loading / back-end loading 
can be developed.
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